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of neutrality in governmental
action toward religion by inval-
idating a statute designed to aid
a religious enclave. The deci-
sion signaled the Court's recog-
nition of the need to evolve from
the frequently criticized Lemon
test. By not developing awork-
able standard, the Court left lit-
tle guidance to legislatures and
lower courts in determining
whether a statute passes consti-
tutional muster under the Es-
tablishment Clause.
- David A. Prichard
Ibanez v. Florida Dept
of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Bet of
Accountancy:
STATE BEARS
BURDEN OF
DEMONSTRATING
THAT TRUTHFUL
DISCLOSURE OF
CERTIFIED FINAN-
CIAL PLANNER AND
CERTIFIED PUBLIC
A CCOUNTANT
DESIGNATIONS IN
COMMERCIAL
SPEECH
ISACTUALLY, INHER-
ENTLY, OR
POTENTIALLY
MISLEADING, OR
ADVANCES A SUB-
STANTIAL STATE
INTEREST BY
THE LEASTINTRU-
SIVE MEANS IF IT
DESIRES
TO RESTRICT SUCH
SPEECH.
In Ibanez v. Florida
Dept. of Business and Profes-
sional Regulation, Bd. of Ac-
countancy, 114 S. Ct. 2084
(1994), the United States Su-
preme Court reiterated the
heavy burden incumbent upon
state governments attempting
to censure or limit constitution-
ally protected commercial
speech when it considered the
disclosure of validly held desig-
nations of "Certified Public
Accountant" (CPA) and "Cer-
tified Financial Planner" (CFP),
by a person holding herself out
as an attorney, in advertising
and other communications with
the public. The Court held that
the State must demonstrate with
sufficient specificity, not mere
speculation or conjecture, that
the public would actually be
misled or harmed by the Peti-
tioner's commercial speech, if
the State desires to restrict truth-
ful commercial speech. The
State must also show that the
manner ofrestriction is no more
extensive than that which is nec-
essary to serve the State's inter-
est. In so holding, the Court
addressed whether the CFP des-
ignation is commonly recog-
nized and, consequently, wheth-
er it would mislead a consumer
into thinking that a CFP is cer-
tified by the State.
The Petitioner, Silvia
Safille Ibanez, is a practicing
attorney in Winter Haven, Flor-
ida. In addition to being a mem-
ber of the Florida Bar, Ibanez is
licensed by the Respondent,
Florida Board of Accountancy
(Board), as a CPA, and is autho-
rized to use the designation
"Certified Financial Planner"
or "CFP" by a private organi-
zation known as the Certified
Financial Planner Board of Stan-
dards (CFPBS).
The gravamen of the
Board's complaint is that Ibanez
engaged in "false, deceptive,
and misleading" advertising
when she included her creden-
tials as a CPA and a CFP in her
yellow pages listing, under the
"Attorneys" section, as well as
in her other communications
with the public. The Board
instituted an investigation, and
eventually a complaint against
Ibanez, after receiving an anon-
ymous copy of her yellow pages
listing. Pursuant to various sec-
tions of the Public Accountancy
Act, Board Rules, and the Flor-
ida Administrative Code, the
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Board charged that Ibanez prac-
ticed public accounting in an
unlicensed firm, that she used a
specialty designation that was
not approved by the Board
(CFP), and that she engaged in
"false, deceptive, and mislead-
ing" advertising by appending
the letters CPA to her name
thereby implying that she was
bound by the Public Accoun-
tancy Act.
During the subsequent
administrative hearing, the
Board dropped the allegation of
practicing public accounting in
an unlicensed firm and the Hear-
ing Officer found in favor of
Ibanez on the remaining counts
for want of requisite proof.
Despite the Hearing Officer's
recommendation that the other
chargesbe dismissed, the Board,
in its Final Order of the Board of
Accountancy (May 12, 1992)
("Final Order"), declared
Ibanez guilty on both counts.
The District Court of Appeals
for the First District affirmed
the Board's decisionpercuriam,
upon Ibanez's appeal. Because
this action prohibited review by
the Florida Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed.
After summarily con-
cluding that the use of the CPA
and CFP designations was com-
mercial speech for purposes of
the First Amendment, the Court
began its analysis by noting a
number of cases that have
stressed the burden carried by
the State when it attempts to
restrict the free flow of truthful
commercial speech. Ibanez, 114
S. Ct. at 2088-89. As these
cases previously held, the re-
striction of truthful, non-mis-
leading advertising is allowed
only if the State demonstrates
that the regulation is no more
extensive than necessary to
materially advance a substantial
state interest. Id. at 2088 (citing
Central Hudson Gas &Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980)). This is due to the
general theory that "disclosure
oftruthful, relevant information
is more likely to make a positive
contribution to decisionmaking
than is concealment of such in-
formation." Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2088-89 (quoting Peel v. At-
torney Registration and Disci-
plinary Comm 'nofIll., 496 U.S.
91, 108 (1990)). This position
was further reinforced by the
Court's declaration that thejus-
tification of restricting truthful
commercial speech must be
based on real and articulable
harms, rather than "mere spec-
ulation or conjecture." Ibanez,
114 S. Ct. at 2089 (quoting
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S.Ct.
1792 (1993)). The Court rea-
soned that the value ofcommer-
cial speech was great enough to
impose upon State regulators
the significant costs of distin-
guishing between commercial
speech that is truthful and false,
helpful and misleading, and
harmless and harmful. Ibanez,
114 S. Ct. at 2089 (citing Zauder
v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel of Supreme Court of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)).
Having established the
standard for the restriction of
truthful commercial speech, the
Court considered Petitioner's
commercial communications
that included use of the CPA
designation. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2089. Initially, the Board
asserted that although Ibanez
did hold a valid CPA license, her
use of the CPA designation
would lead the public to believe
that she was subject to the pro-
visions of the Public Accoun-
tancy Act and to the Board it-
self, when she in fact did not
believe this to be the case. Id. In
her brief to the Court, however,
Ibanez withdrew her objections
to theBoard's assertion ofjuris-
diction. Id. While Petitioner's
withdrawn objection essentially
made the Board's decision re-
garding this matter inconsequen-
tial, the Court addressed wheth-
er Ibanez's belief as to the
Board's jurisdiction was
sanctionable. Id.
The Court focused on
the Board's lack of specific ev-
idence of noncompliance by
Ibanez as the essential missing
element in the Board's Final
Order. Id. In fact, the Court
noted that the only allegation by
the Board of any sanctionable
misconduct was the charge of
practicing public accounting in
an unlicensed firm, which it
eventually chose to drop. Id. at
2089 n.8. Additionally, the
Court stressed that Petitioner's
personal belief that she was be-
yond the Board's authority was
not a specific act of noncompli-
ance and that sanctioning
Ibanez's use of the CPA desig-
nation for that sole reason vio-
lated her First Amendment right
to free speech. Id (citing Baird
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v. State Bar of Arizona, 401
U.S. 1, 6 (1971)). Thus, the
Court held that because Ibanez
had an active CPA license, it
was unlikely that her truthful
representation of her CPA
licensure could mislead a con-
sumer. Id
The Court next turned
to Ibanez's disclosure of her
CFP status, which the Board
maintained was subject to the
Board's restriction because"certified" inherently misleads
the public into assuming that the
Board, and therefore the State,
has licensed or approved the
individual with the CFP status.
In analyzing this issue, the Court
relied on its opinion, as did the
Board, in Peel v. Attorney Reg-
istration and Disciplinary
Comm'n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91
(1990). Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at
2089-91. In Peel, the Court
held "that an attorney's use of
the designation 'Certified Civil
Trial Specialist By the National
Board of Trial Advocacy' was
neither actually nor inherently
misleading," despite the fact that
such certification was not grant-
ed by the State. Id. at 2089-90.
In addition, Peel stated that cer-
tification by bonafide specialist
organizations (such as the Cer-
tified Financial Planner Board
of Standards) used in commer-
cial speech, that are not actually
or inherently misleading, may
not be completelybanned. Id at
2090 (emphasis added).
Similar to the Court's
consideration of the CPA issue,
the Court admonished the
Board's failure to offer evidence
that distinguished the instant
case from that in Peel. Id. Be-
cause the Board did not sub-
stantiate its assertion that the
CFP designation was actually
or inherently misleading, but
rather contended only that de-
ception could occur in hypo-
thetical cases, the Court found
that the Board had not over-
come the "constitutional pre-
sumption favoring disclosure
over concealment." Id. (quot-
ing Peel, 496 U.S. at 111).
Relying upon the con-
curring opinions of Justices
Marshall and Brennan in Peel,
the Board alternatively main-
tained that the use of the CFP
designation was "potentially
misleading," thus allowing the
Board to prevent deception or
confusion resulting from dis-
closure of CFP status by em-
ploying any measures short of a
total ban. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at
2090. In response, the Court
reiterated its requirement that
the Board must demonstrate that
the dangers to the public, as a
result of the specified commer-
cial speech "are real and that its
restriction will in fact alleviate
them to a material degree." Id.
(quoting Edenfield v. Fane,
113 S. Ct. 1792(1993)). More-
over, the words "potentially
misleading," when used as the
solejustification without expla-
nation, are not a catch-all phrase
that empower a State organiza-
tion to restrict truthful commer-
cial speech. Ibanez, 114 S. Ct.
at 2090 (citing Edenfield, 113
S.Ct. 1792). Here again, the
Board offered no evidence tend-
ing to demonstrate its concern
that the CFP designation was
"potentially misleading."
Ibanez, 114 S. Ct. at 2090.
The Court, however, did
acknowledge that the concur-
ring opinion of Justice Marshall
in Peel found the .use of the
term "NBTA Certified Civil
Trial Specialist" potentiallymis-
leading. Id. at 2091 (emphasis
added). Distinguishing the Peel
concurrence while applying its
rationale to the case at hand, the
Court noted that Peel did not
state that all specialty designa-
tions were similarly situated. Id.
The Peel court also implicitly
acknowledged that other more
commonly recognized certify-
ing specialty organizations could
certify individuals with desig-
nations that would not be po-
tentially misleading. Id. (em-
phasis added). As a result, the
Court addressed the background
of the financial planning field
along with a brief analysis of
certification requirements. Not-
ing that the terms "Certified
Financial Planner" and "CFP"
are both "well-established, pro-
tected federal trademarks," and
that the method ofCFP licensure
is similar to that of CPA
licensure, the Court held that
restricting disclosure ofthe CFP
status in commercial speech was
violative of the First Amend-
ment. Id.
The significance of the
Ibanez opinion lies not in the
Court's decision that the State
bears a heavy burden in justify-
ing restrictions upon the use of
a validly held CPA designation
in commercial speech, but rath-
er in the finding that the disclo-
sure of the CFP designation in
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truthful commercial speech is
not actually, inherently, or po-
tentially misleading under the
facts alleged. Because the CFP
designation is not considered
misleading in any way, under
the facts of Ibanez, State re-
striction is not allowed under
the First Amendment. As noted
in the opinion, approximately
27,000 persons have qualified
for the CFP designation. Con-
sequently, the Supreme Court's
stance on its use by individuals
and restriction by the States
becomes important since a per-
son's credentials are often con-
sidered by consumers when
choosing a service provider --
including financial planners.
- Fiorello J.P. Vicencio Jr.
Lesnick v. Hollingsworth
& Vose Co.:
ACTIONS
PURPOSELY
DIRECTED TOWARD
FOR UM STATE
REQUIRED TO
SUBJECT OUT-
OF-STATE
DEFENDANT TO
PERSONAL
JURISDICTION.
In Lesnick v.
Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35
F.3d 939 (4th Cir. 1994), the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that
Maryland courts may not exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over
an out-of-state defendant un-
less the defendant's actions were
purposely directed toward the
forum state. In so ruling, the
court followed the long-stand-
ing Supreme Court decisions on
minimum contacts. Thus, in
order for a state to assert per-
sonaljurisdiction, the defendant
must have certain minimum con-
tacts with the forum state and
the defendant must have rea-
sonably anticipated being sub-
ject to suit in the forum state.LtiWnc. ('torilarcd'),
a New York corporation, and
Hollingsworth & Vose Co.
("Hollingsworth"), a Massa-
chusetts corporation, with their
principal places of business in
New York and Massachusetts,
respectively, produced the Kent
cigarette. The filter medium
was manufacturedbyHollingsworth
in Massachusetts and shipped to
Lorillard's plants in Kentucky
and New Jersey, where the final
Kent cigarettes with the
"Micronite Filter" were manu-
factured. Hollingsworth pro-
vided Lorillard with an estimat-
ed 10 billion asbestos-contain-
ing filters which Lorillard dis-
tributed throughout the nation
between 1952 and 1956.
Hollingsworth was cognizant of
Lorillard's national distribution,
but Hollingsworth did not di-
rect any of its business toward
the state of Maryland.
StanleyLesnick, aMary-
land resident, regularly smoked
Kent cigarettes and died of can-
cer caused by years of inhaling
the cancer-causing agent "cro-
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